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THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S RESTATEMENT
OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS ANNOTATED WITH
KENTUCKY DECISIONS (CONCLUDED)*
By Roy MoR=NDt"
Section 372. Mutuality of Remedy.
(1) The fact that the remedy of specific enforcement is
not available to one party is not a sufficient reason for refusing
it to the other party.
(2) The fact that the remedy of specific enforcement is
available to one party to a contract is not in itself a sufficient
reason for making the remedy available to the other; but it is of
weight when it accompanies other reasons, and it may be decisive when the adequacy of damages is difficult to determine and
there is no other reason for refusing specific enforcement.
Comment on Subsection (1) :
a. The law does not provide or require that the two parties to
a contract shall have identical remedies in case of breach. A plaintiff will not be refused specific performance merely because the contract is such that the defendant could not have obtained such a decree, had the plaintiff refused to perform prior to the present suit.
It is enough that he has not refused and that the court is satisfied
that the defendant is not going to be wrongfully denied the agreed
exchange for his performance. The substantial purpose of all attempted rules requiring mutuality of remedy is to make sure that
the defendant will not be compelled to perform specifically without
good security, that he will receive specifically the agreed equivalent
in exchange. Sufficient security often exists where there is no mu* This is a continuation of the Kentucky Annotations to the Restatement of Contracts. The work is being done by Professor Frank
Murray of the College of Law, University of Kentucky, assisted by the
other members of the faculty in cooperation with the Kentucky State
Bar Association. The Topic on Specific Performance was annotated
by Professor Roy Moreland. The first installment of this Topic appeared in the March, 1936, issue. William Fanning, Ashland, a graduate of- the University, rendered valuable assistance.
This will be the last of the annotations to the Restatement of
the Law of Contracts to be published in the Kentucky Law Journal.
The American Law Institute will publish the restatement annotated
with Kentucky Decisions in book form within a short time.
tRoy Moreland, A. B., Transylvania College, 1920; LL. B., University of Kentucky College of Law, 1923; J. D., University of Chicago Law School, 1928. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky
College of Law; contributor to various legal periodicals.
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tuality of remedy; and there are cases in which mutuality of remedy
would not in itself be adequate. Security in much more effective form
may be required, as is indicated in Comment a on Section 373.
b. The plaintiff may already have fully performed, in which
case the defendant needs no remedy. If the plaintiff's return performance is already due or will become due in specified portions as the
defendant proceeds with his performance, the decree in the plaintiff's
favor will be made conditional on his rendering the return performance. Further, the defendant may be required to perform at once,
even though the return performance by the plaintiff is to become due
much later, if there is sufficient security that it will be rendered when
due (see Comment b on Sec. 373). Such a decree sufficiently protects
the defendant against having to give something for nothing; and it
Is not essential that the plaintiff's return performance should be one
that will be specifically compelled.

Illustrationsof Subsection (1) :
1. A promises to act as B's nurse for a year; and B promises in
return to transfer spebifed land to A. A fully performs as agreed;
but B refuses to convey. A can get a decree for specific performance,
even though at no time would a similar decree have been available
to B.
3. By fraudulent statements A induces B to make a bilateral
contract for the purchase of A's land. B can get a decree for specific
performance by A, even though the latter could not have enforced
the contract by any remedy whatever had B chosen to avoid it. B's
ratification has made the contract mutually enforceable.
6. A contracts, in return for $100 paid by B, to convey land
for $10,000, if paid within thirty days. B assigns to C his right under
this option contract. C gives notice Qf acceptance and tenders $10,000 within the thirty days. C can get specific performance, conditional on payment of the price, even though, prior to the notice of
acceptance, A could not have compelled performance by either B or C.

Annotation:
The cases In Kentucky are in confusion upon the matter covered
in this section. Our court has confused mutuality of obligation and
mutuality of remedy. Lord Fry's rule of mutuality, since repudiated
by the majority of jurisdictions, Is affirmed in some of the earlier decisions.
(1) There are three leading cases in Kentucky which state a
general rule contrary to Section 372 but all avoid the consequences of
the rule on other grounds. The first case, Burton v. Shotwell, 76 Ky.
(13 Bush) 271 (1877), emphatically affirmed the rule formulated by
Lord Fry (Fry on Specific Performance, Sec. 286) and the court
stated that the rule of mutuality applied to both remedy and obligation. However, the court held that there was requisite mutuality as
to both in the principal case. The rule is further affirmed in

L. J.-6
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Moayon v. Moayon, 114 Ky. 855, 72 S. W. 33 (1903), where the court
found on the facts that the contract was mutually binding and that
the remedy for its enforcement was mutually available. However,
apparently, the court failed to note that in this case the contract was
not specifically enforceable by both parties at the time of its execution,
a necessary requirement under the Lord Fry rule. In Ochs v. Kramer,
32 Ky. L. R. 762, 107 S. W. 260 (1908), the court again affirmed Lord
Fry's rule, although the language of the opinion is rather vague.
Thus, from these three cases it may be seen that a doctrine contrary to Section 372 of the restatement has been announced in Kentucky, although in each case it was held inapplicable because of the
particular circumstances. In all three cases, the defendant, by the
decree, would run no risk of being compelled to perform without receiving the agreed exchange. We have been unable to locate a single
Kentucky case which has denied specific performance on the ground
of lack of mutuality of remedy. On the contrary, an examination of
the Kentucky cases, which in fact reach a result in accord with Sec.
tion 372 of the restatement, discloses that our court has greatly
qualified the doctrine announced in Burton v. Shotwell, Moayon v.
Moayon, and Ochs v. Kramer, supra. Such qualifications and exceptions indicate that our court in these cases did not really stop to consider the problems involved in Lord Fry's rule of mutuality.
The first exception, engrafted by the Kentucky court on Fry's
rule of mutuality, is that "a plaintiff who has performed his part of
a contract, although he could not have been compelled in equity to do
so, may enforce specific performance by the defendant."
This Is
the seventh proposition in in the valuable article by Dean Ames on
Mutuality, 3 Col. L. Rev. 1. Kentucky cases affirming the exception
are: Logan County National Bank v. Townsend, 8 Ky. L. R. 694, 3
S. W. 122 (1877) (action at law for damages); Moayon v. Moayon,
supra; Allen v. New Domain Oil & Gas Co., 24 Ky. L. R. 2169, 73
S. W. 747 (1903). And, if the defendant by delay or other conduct
on his part subsequent to the contract has lost his right of equitable
relief against the plaintiff, he cannot complain of being compelled to
perform specifically. Ochs v. Kramer, supra.
Further, in many cases, a vendee of land can get a decree for
specific performance against a vendor whose title is defective with
compensation, even though the vendor could not have enforced the
contract. This is the fourth proposition in the article by Dean Ames,
supra. McConnell's Heirs v. Dunlap's Devisees, 3 Ky. (Hardin) 44
(1805); Jones v. Shackelford, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 410 (1811).
The eighth exception suggested by Dean Ames to Fry's rule of
mutuality was, "One who has contracted to sell land not owned by
him, and who, therefore, could not be cast in a decree, may by acquiring title before the time fixed for the conveyance compel the execution of the contract by the buyer." This is the law in Kentucky.
And, furthermore, if time is not of the essence, he may have a rea-
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sonable time after the date of performance to perfect his title.
Tyree v. Williams, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 365 (1814) (dictum); Logan v.
Bull, 78 Ky. 607 (1880); Smith v. Cansler, 83 Ky. 367, 7 Ky. L. R. 317
(1885) (dictum); Tapp v. 2ock, 89 Ky. 414, 12 S. W. 713 (1889).
However, the dictum in Ochs v. Kramer, supra, is of contrary import.
A further exception to the rule of mutuality occurs in the case
of contracts of married women. It has been held that a contract by
a married woman to sell her land, the husband not joining in the contract, may be enforced at the suit of the vendor if the husband is
willing to join in the conveyance, although the vendee would have
been unable to get specific enforcement against the vendor due to
Kentucky Statutes, section 2128. Hoffman v. Colgan, 25 Ky. L. R.
98, 74 S. W. 724 (1903). However, by section 2128, Kentucky Statutes, a contract by a married woman to sell her realty, where the
husband is not a party to the contract, is void, according to a decision of the court. Brown v. Allen, 204 Ky. 76, 263 S. W. 717 (1924).
It may be presumed, therefore, by considering Hoffman v. Colgan,
supra, and Brown v. Allen, supra, together, that if the vendee should
withdraw his offer before the husband and wife joined in a deed and
tendered it to him, or the husband otherwise assented in writing to
the contract, that the vendor would have no right of action whatever. Perhaps the court is in error and such a contract is "unenforceable" rather than void.
It is settled in Kentucky that an option holder may get a decree
for specific performance, if he exercises his power in accordance with
the terms of the contract and performs all conditions precedent.
Bacon v. Kentucky Cent. Ry. Co., 95 Ky. 373, 16 Ky. L. R. 77, 25 S. W.
747 (1894); Walton's Exr. v. Franks, 191 Ky. 32, 228 S. W. 1025
(1921); Hogg v. Forsythe, 198 Ky. 462, 248 S. W. 1008 (1923); Garvin
v. Steen, 243 Ky. 256, 47 S. W. (2d) 1010 (1932). However, this has
not always been the rule in Kentucky. Several early cases refused
to make this exception to the rule of mutuality, holding that since an
option contract secured to one party a "mere option to purchase"
it was void for want of mutuality of obligation. Boucher v. Vanbuskirk, 2 A. K. Marsh. 345 (1820). The rule was not changed until in
1888 in Bank of Louisville v. Baumeister, 87 Ky. 6, 7 S. W. 170 (1889).
Although specific performance could not be obtained against him,
the assignee of the purchaser of an executory contract for the sale
of land may obtain specific performance. Respass v. Mclanahan, 9
Ky. (2 A. K. Marsh.) 577 (1820); Benjamin v. Dinwiddie, 226 Ky. 106,
10 S. W. (2d) 620 (1928) (dictum).
Cooperative marketing associations will be given a decree for
negative enforcement of the contract by way of injunction, although
the supposed requisites of mutuality of remedy do not exist. Grant
County Board of Control v. Allphin, 152 Ky. 280, 153 S. W. 417 (1913);
Owen County Burley Tobacco Society v. Brumback, 128 Ky. 137, 107
S. W. 710 (1908); Potter v. Dark Tobacco Growers Cooperative Asso-
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ciation, 201 Ky. 441, 257 S. W. 33 (1923) (discussion of "mutuality of
obligation" only, p. 448, and p. 36) (based on statute but approving
Grant County Board of Control v. A7lphin, supra).
There are a number of cases in Kentucky discussing the absence
of mutuality of remedy that properly involve the absence of mutuality of obligation, and, hence, deal with agreements that do not rise
to the dignity of contracts. The annotator has deemed it inadvisable
to list or discuss them.
Attention, perhaps, should be called to the fact that the fifth
a
proposition stated by Dean Ames in 3 Columbia Law Review, "party to a bilateral contract, who has signed a memorandum of it,
may be compelled to perform it specifically, although he could not
maintain a bill against the other party who has not signed such a
memorandum," is not the law in Kentucky as to contracts concerning
the sale of an interest in land. Our court construes the phrase "party
to be charged" in the Statute of Frauds as applying to the vendor.
Thus, if the vendor signs, both parties are bound. Evans v. Stratton,
142 Ky. 615, 134 S. W. 1154 (1911) (citing early cases); Wren v. Cooksey, 147 Ky. 825, 145 S. W. 1116 (1912); Smith v. Ballou, 211 Ky. 281,
277 S. W. 286 (1925); Reeves v. Walker, 219 Ky. 615, 294 S. W. 183
(1927); Benjamin v. Dinwiddie, 226 Ky. 106, 10 S. W. (2d) 620 (1928).
If the vendor does not sign, neither party is bound. Armstrong v.
Lyen, 148 Ky. 59, 145 S. W. 1120 (1912); City of Murray v. Crawford,
138 Ky. 25, 127 S. W. 494 (1910); Smith v. Baflou, 211 Ky. 281, 277
S. W. 286 (1925). And, this is true, despite the fact that the vendee
may have signed, and the vendor is the plaintiff in the action. Armstrong v. Lyen, supra; Smith v. Ballou, supra; 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 680.
It may be noted from the above cases, that our court does not apply
the doctrine of continuing offer to cases arising under the Statute of
Frauds, as it did in Hoffman v. Colgan, supra, where the contract was
void due to the Married Women's Act.
It is believed that the rule of mutuality of remedy, apparently
affirmed in the early Kentucky cases cited at the beginning of this
annotation, as a condition of equitable relief, has been so qualified by
the exceptions noted herein, that, "viewed as a precept of general
validity, it has ceased to be a rule today". The exceptions have
"eaten up the rule". The result, it is believed, is that modern Kentucky decisions, with the possible exception, in part, of contracts concerning the sale of an interest in land, where the Statute of Frauds
Is involved, follow the rule of the restatement.
(2)
We have no cases exactly in point with this subsection, and
but little dicta.
The fact that the remedy of specific performance with compensation is available to the vendee, where the title is defective or the land
deficient, does not give to the vendor a like remedy under the same
Jones v. Shackelford, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 410 (1811)
circumstances.
(strong dictum).
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Our cases, permitting a vendor to sue for specific enforcement of
a contract for the sale of an interest in land are not placed on the
ground of mutuality of remedy, but probably on the ground of inadequacy of the remedy at law.
No doubt subsection (2) would be approved by the Kentucky
court.

Section 373. Requirement of Security that the Agreed
Exchange will be Rendered.
Specific
tial part of
compelled is
performance

enforcement may properly be refused if a substanthe agreed exchange for the performance to be
as yet unperformed and its concurrent or future
is not well secured to the satisfaction of the court.

Comment:
a. The purpose of the rule stated in the Section is to make sure
that the defendant is not compelled to render his promised performance substantially in full without also receiving substantially in
full the performance constituting the agreed exchange. In actions for
damages for a total breach, the defendant is required to pay money
only; and the amount is always reduced by the saving effected to the
plaintiff by his not having to proceed with his own performance. If
the defendant is compelled to perform specifically, the plaintiff is
expected to do the same; and there is no saving. It may, indeed, be
said that where the contract provides for performance by the defendant before the return performance by the plaintiff, the defendant consciously assumes the risk of non-performance by the plaintiff that is
involved in those facts. But after a controversy has arisen and litigation has begun, that risk may be considerably increased. There is no
Injustice to the plaintiff in requiring the reduction of that risk, as
the price of getting so drastic a remedy. This is made all the more
obvious by the fact that frequently security to the defendant can be
afforded by the terms of the decree itself, without cost to the plaintiff
beyond his agreed performance, and that in other cases the cost of
giving other security is comparatively little.
b. If performance by the plaintiff is already due, or will be due
simultaneously with the defendant's performance, either as a single
simultaneous exchange or as a series of continuing exchanges such
that no great risk is involved, the decree may be made conditional on
the rendition of the agreed performance by the plaintiff. If performance by the plaintiff is not to become due until after full performance by the defendant or until some time as yet undetermined, the
plaintiff Js often willing that the decree shall be conditional upon
simultaneous performance; and even if he is not willing, it may be
just to require him to choose between damages as a remedy and a decree that is conditional upon an early performance by himself, making
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a proper discount when feasible. In other cases, the decree may reasonably be made conditional upon the execution of a mortgage as a
security for future performance, or the giving of other collateral. In
still other cases, the plaintiff may already have so far partly performed and so deeply invested his funds and labor, that his own economic interest constitutes an adequate security to the defendant; in
these cases no further security need be required by the court. In
every case the court will mold its decree in the exercise of sound
judicial discretion.
Iliustrations:
1. A contracts to sell land to B, part of the purchase price to be
paid in installments after the time set for the conveyance of the land.
B may properly be given a decree for specific performance by A, conditional on B's executing a mortgage or giving other satisfactory
security that the payments will be made. This is so even though the
contract provides for no such security.
2. A contracts to transfer land to B immediately, in return for
B's promise to render personal services to A for period of years.
There is a dispute between them causing unfriendly relations; and
A refuses to convey. B cannot get a decree for conveyance of the land
because of the increased risk that the personal service will not be
rendered as agreed, and because sufficient security that it will be so
rendered is lacking. Damages are the more satisfactory remedy. . ..

6. A, a fruit growers' cooperative association, organized for
mutual benefit under a statute designed to improve the economic conditions of industry, contracts with its members to market their product, each member promising in return to deal exclusively with the
association. B, one of the members, threatens a breach of his promise,
imperiling the success of the organization. There is nothing to indicate that A will mail to market B's product as agreed. The court
may in its discretion enforce B's promise by an injunction, without
requiring additional security from A.

Annotation:
Several cases have affirmed the rule that a complainant in order
to obtain specific performance must show that he has performed or
that he is ready to assure performance of his part of the contract.
Turner v. Clay, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 52 (1812); Bryant v. Jones, 255 Ky. 606,
75 S. W. (2d) 34 (1934).
There are several cases requiring a vendee seeking enforcement of
a contract to convey land, to deposit the purchase money in court or
make other provision to insure the protection of the vendor. Campbell
v. Lear, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 452 (1811); Tyler v. Onzts, 93 Ky. 331, 14 Ky.
L. R. 321, 20 S. W. 256 (1892).
In one case, the vendee was to pay the purchase money in install-
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ments. Upon suit by the vendee, the court directed that he either
pay all remaining installments or have his bill dismissed. Ferguson v.
Cabell, 141 Ky. 499, 133 S. W. 539 (1911).
If a grantor, who is to convey with warranty, becomes insolvent,
in order for him to secure specific enforcement, a responsible person
may be required to join the insolvent grantor in the conveyance and
warranty. Tyree v. Williams, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 365, 6 Am. Dec. 663
(1814).
Cases where the vendor sues and is met by the plea that the
vendee is not assured the agreed exchange are adequately covered by
other sections of the restatement, so only a few will be referred to
here. The rule is' applicable in these cases to situations arising in this
manner. The vendor §ues for specific performance and the vendee
defends on the ground that the plaintiff cannot give an unincumbered
title, that there is a deficiency in acreage, etc. In such cases a court
of equity will not force the vendee to perform where the performance
for which he contracted and in consideration for which his promise
to perform was made cannot be rendered. Lewis v. Herndon, 13 Ky.
(3 Litt.) 358 (1823); Milani, et ux. v. Young et ux., 211 Ky. 714, 277
S. W. 1018 (1925). Johnston's Heirs v. Mitchell's Heirs, 8 Ky. 225
(1818), was such a case and the court said: "Where one party is unable to perform his part of the contract he cannot be entitled to performance of the contract by the other party."
It has been held -that the giving of a note by the vendee, unless so
provided in the contract, is not sufficient payment to obtain specific
performance for the vendee. Wheeler v. McClain, 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 81
(1835), Harlan's Admr. v. Brown, 1 Ky. Op. 118 (1866), and on rehearing 1 Ky. Op. 291 (1867), was a similar case. There the vendee
gave a note to a bank to get the purchase money and the vendor was
surety on the note. The court stated that It would not force the
vendor to give up legal title to the land until the note was paid off.
Two cases in Kentucky deal with suits by cooperative marketing
associations seeking specific enforcement of marketing agreements. In
both cases enforcement was decreed against the recalcitrant membersNo point was made in either case that the defendant member had no
guarantee of performance by the association. Grant County Board of
Control v. Allphin, 152 Ky. 280, 153 S. W. 417 (1913); Potter v. Dark
Tobacco Growers Cooperative Association, 201 Ky. 441, 257 S. W. 33
(1923).

Section 374. Performance of Conditions; Provisions Involving Penalty or Forfeiture.
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), specific enforcement will be refused if a condition precedent to the duty to be
enforced has not been and cannot be performed and is not excused, or if a condition subsequent terminating the duty has
occurred.
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(2) Specific enforcement will not be refused by reason of
provisions in the contract which make the duty of performance
depend upon conditions, precedent or subsequent, of such a
nature that refusal of a decree will effectuate an unjust penalty
or forfeiture, and if substantial performance of the agreed exchange is assured as required by the rule stated in Section 373.
Comment:
a. A fact or event may be operative as a condition precedent or
a condition subsequent by the specific words of the contract, by reasonable implications of fact, or by construction of law for purposes of
justice (See Sections 250-290). This is the case, whether the remedy
sought in an action is damages or specific performance. Further, the
performance of such a condition may be excused, or its actual occurrence be made inoperative, by reason of the conduct of the party in
whose favor it is intended to operate or of other supervening events
(See Sections 294-308). Again, this is true whether the remedy
sought is damages or specific performance. But in suits for the latter
remedy, the discretionary powers of the court and the flexibility permitted in the form of the decree very materially affect the recognition of conditions and their jural operation (See Section 359). They
may be less readily inferred and constructive conditions may be less
frequently imposed, since the agreed performance on the part of the
plaintiff can be secured by the form of the decree. In particular, performance or tender before bringing suit will much less often be held
to be a condition. Pehalties and forfeitures in excess of just compensation will be avoided, even in disregard of expressed provisions creating a condition precedent or a condition subsequent; but such provisions will be disregarded only to attain this end, and never at the cost
of depriving the defendant of the substantial exchange for his own
enforced performance. If a condition precedent is still possible of performance it may be proper to grant a decree that is itself subject to
performance of the condition (See Section 359).

Illustrations:
1. A contracts to sell land to B at a price to be fixed by C as
appraiser. C refuses to make any appraisal. Neither A nor B can
get a decree for specific performance, at a valuation to be made by
the court or otherwise. Appraisal by C is a condition precedent to
the duty of each party and there is no impending forfeiture to make
its operation unjust.
2. A contracts to sell land to B for $10,000, payable in 30 days,
time to be of the essence. B makes a down paymentof $500; and it
is agreed that this sum may be retained by A as liquidated damages
in case of default. B fails to tender the balance until two days after
it is due. The price that A could have got for his land during the
thirty-day period is unbertain; and so also is its value after B's de-
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fault. B may properly be refused a decree for specific performance or
for restitution. No unjust forfeiture is shown.

Annotation:
(1)
The Kentucky cases on this point are few in number. If the
performance of a duty is a condition precedent to the right to be enforced, the complainant must show he has performed. Passnorc's
Heirs v. Moore, 24 Ky. (1 J. J. Marsh.) 591 (1829); Stevenson v. Dunlap's Heirs, 23 Ky. (7 T. B. Monroe) 134, 142 (1828) (dictum). Thus,
where the contract was to convey land "so soon as purchase money is
paid" payment was held to be a condition precedent to a conveyance.
Sprigg's Heirs v. Albin's Heirs, 29 Ky. (6 J. J. Marsh.) 158 (1831). And,
in Kirkpatrick v. Lebus, 184 Ky. 139, 211 S. W. 572 (1919), the court
held that an unreasonable delay in the performance of a condition
precedent would defeat specific performance.
Where the contract provides that land is to be conveyed if the
purchaise money is paid on a date named, payment on that date has
been held to be a condition precedent to enforcement, where time is
of the essence. Jones v. Noble, 66 Ky. 694 (1868). And, see Stembridge v. Stenbridge's Admr., 87 Ky. 91, 7 S. W. 611 (1888); Broc7. v.
Tennis Coal Co., 29 Ky. L. R. 1283, 97 S. W. 46 (1906); Asher v.
Roberts, 206 Ky. 186, 266 S. W. 1089 (1924).
These cases illustrate
that time, although not generally of the essence, may be so under
the facts of a particular case. See Meaux v. Helm's Heirs, 2 Ky.
(Sneed) 252 (1802).
(2)
There is a surprising scarcity of cases involving the problem raised by this subsection.
In KercizevaZ v. Swope, 22 Ky. (6 T. B. Monroe) 362 (1827), notes
were given by the vendee to the vendor in payment of land, the vendor
to reenter if they were not paid. The vendor assigned the notes but
did not notify the vendee of the assignment until after the notes
became due. The vendee was granted specific performance notwithstanding his failure to pay them on the day due. The court announced
that it would relieve against penalties and forfeitures. A stronger
case is Page v. Hughes, 41 Ky. (2 B. Monroe) 439 (1842), where the
lessee for a term had the privilege of purchasing the property by making payment before the end of the term. The lessee made very valuable improvements but failed for good reasons to tender the purchase
money until 21 days after the expiration of the term. However, under
the facts of the case, the lessee was given specific performance in order
to prevent a forfeiture.

Section 375. Effect of Breach by the Plaintiff.
(1) Specific enforcement will not be decreed if the plaintiff
has himself committed a material breach unless refusal of the
decree will effectuate an unjust penalty or forfeiture.
(2) Specific enforcement may properly be decreed, in spite
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of a minor breach or innocent misrepresentation by the plaintiff, involving no substantial failure of the exchange for the performance to be compelled.
(3) If specific enforcement is decreed in spite of a breach
by the plaintiff, the defendant has a right to compensation for
such breach. This may be given either by making a just abatement in the price or other performance to be rendered by the
defendant, or by making the decree conditional on payment to
the defendant of reasonable compensation in money.

Comment on Subsection (1) :
a. A decree for specific performance will not be granted in cases
where the plaintiff has repudiated his duty without making timely
retraction (see Sections 280, 319, 397) or has otherwise already committed such a substantial breach as to discharge the duty of the defendant. What breaches will constitute such a discharge is stated in
Sections 274-290, and Sections 397-400. It is obvious that specific
performance will not be de6reed if the defendant's duty has been discharged in any manner, whether by the plaintiff's breach or otherwise; but there is a special reason for differentiating at this point between material breaches that operate as a discharge and minor
breaches that do not. in a suit for specific performance, a breach by
the plaintiff may not be regarded as totally discharging the defendant, even though it would prevent a judgment for damages. This is
due to the flexibility of an equitable decree, affording greater opportunity to do complete justice in favor of both parties.

IMlustrations of Subsection (1) :
1. A contracts to transfer land to B in fee simple. In fact the
mineral rights in the land are the property of C; and A takes no steps
to procure a conveyance from C. A cannot get a decree for specific
performance by B, even though he offers to make an abatement in the
price ....

Ilustrations of Subsections (2), (3):
b. Minor breaches not constituting the non-performance of an
expressed condition do not operate to discharge the duty of the other
party. For breach of that duty a judgment for damages is an available remedy in spite of the plaintiff's minor default; and so also is a
decree for specific performance if the requisites therefor exist. Matters otherwise unimportant can be given added importance by a specific provision; but a decree for specific performance will not be refused
because of non-performance as thus specifically required, if its refusal
will effectuate an unjust forfeiture (see Section 374). This is particularly applicable to provisions making performance by an exact
time essential. So a tender of performance, often required in an action
for damages, can well be dispensed with wherever the decree can be
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made conditional on performance substantially as agreed, or its execution can be stayed until such performance.

Commnent on Subsection (3):
c. If specific performance is decreed in favor of a plaintiff who
is himself in some default, complete justice requires that the defendant should not be compelled to perform without in the same proceeding compensating him for his injury. Usually this can be done
by an abatement in the price that the decree compels him to pay.
Sometimes it may be necessary to require a money payment by the
plaintiff and to make the decree conditional on such payment ...

Illustrations of Subsections (2), (3) :
5. A contracts to sell to B his farm, represented to contain 150
acres, and to have a house on it in good repair. In fact the farm
contains only 149 acres and the, house is in slight disrepair, the differences not being substantial. A can get a decree for specific performance by B., conditional upon an allowance of reasonable compensation
for the defects.
6. A contracts to sell land to B, conveyance and payment to be
made on May 1st. A tenders conveyance on May 1, but B is not then
able to pay exactly as agreed. B tenders payment on May 10 and A
refuses to convey. The delay is not in itself sufficient, on the facts
stated, to prevent B from getting a decree for specific performance,
conditional on payment in full ...

Annotation:
(1)
Kentucky is in accord with the restatement. Grundy v. Edwards, 30 Ky. (7 J. J. Marsh.) 368 (1832). As far back as 1813 it was
announced by the court that equity will not aid one who has failed
to perform his part of a contract. Clay v. Turner, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 52
(1813).
Partial performance is insufficient. McKean v. Reed, 16 Ky.
(Litt. Sel. Cas.) 395 (1821) (dictum); Moore v. Skidmore, 16 Ky.
(Litt. Sel. Cas.) 453 (1821). And an assignee of the party in default
stands in no better position. Frazier v. Broadnax, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.)
249 (1822); Williamson v. Ingram, 243 Ky. 749, 49 S. W. (2d) 1005
(1932).
The inability of the vendor to convey to the extent contracted may
be a material breach. Snedaker v. Moore, 63 Ky. 542 (1866) (sale of
130 acres; tract contained but 105 acres); Eversole v. Rversole, 27 Ky.
L. R. 385, 85 S. W. 186 (1905) (vendor had previously conveyed mineral rights); Blue Grass Realty Company v. Shelton, 148 Ky. 666, 147
S. W. 33 (1912) (deed tendered reserved a graveyard not mentioned
in the contract); Clifton Land Co. v. Reister, 186 Ky. 155, 216 S. W.
342 (1919) (inability to give title to wall of building); L. & X. Ry. Co.
v. Fuson, 203 Ky. 708, 262 S. W. 1086 (1924) (sale of 250 acres "more
or less"; tract contained but 126 acres). If there Is reasonable doubt
about the title offered by the vendor, he will be denied specific per-
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formance. Beckwith v. Kouns, 45 Ky. (6 B. Mon.) 222 (1845); LowtherKaufman Oil & Gas Company v. Gunnell, 184 Ky. 587, 212 S. W. 593
(1919) (dictum); Foster v. Armstrong, 239 Ky. 719, 40 S. W. (2d) 337
(1931). Failure of a vendee to make monthly payments on purchase
price and breach of covenants as to use of premises constitute material
breaches. Williamson v. Ingram, supra.
However, despite, a breach by the plaintiff, if the refusal of specific performance will effectuate grave hardship and amount to a penalty or forfeiture, it may be decreed. Overton v. French, 2 Ky. (Sneed)
287 (1803); Breckinridge's Heirs v. Clinkinbeard, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 127
(1822) (dictum); Kercheval v. Swope, 22 Ky. (6. T. B. Mon.) 362
(1827).
(2)
Our cases, although few in number, approve this subsection.
Thus, immaterial defects of the title are of no consequence. Collins v.
Park, 93 Ky. 6, 18 S. W. 1013 (1892). The same is true of the failure
of the complainant to perform an immaterial part of the contract.
Peart'sHeirs v. Taylor's Devisees, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 556 (1812); Church
v. Steel's Heirs, 8 Ky. (1 A. K. Marsh.) 328 (1818).
Where the subject matter of the contract is an interest in land, a
delay of a short time in the execution of the contract, if the party not
in default suffers no injury by the delay, will not preclude specific enforcement at the suit of the one who was at fault. Tyler v. Onzts,
93 Ky. 31, 20 S. W. 256 (1892); Kercheval v. Swope, 22 Ky. (6 T. B.
Mon.) 362, 366 (1827); Spaulding v. Alexander, 69 Ky. (6 W. P. D.
Bush) 160 (1869); Stone v. First National Bank, 4 Ky. L. R. 438, 11
Ky. Op. 796 (1882). In Boyce v. Pritchett's Heirs, 36 Ky. (6 Dana)
231 (1838). Specific performance was decreed after a delay to tender a
deed for eleven years; the buyer, however, was in possession.
It is thoroughly established that the existence of a lien which is
removed before suit by the vendor is no defense to an actibn for
specific performance. And, though the lien be not released, still, if it
may be satisfied out of the unpaid purchase price, the existence of the
lien is immaterial. Posey v. Kimsey, 146 Ky. 205, 142 S. W. 703 (1912);
It has been held
Bean v. Brown, 202 Ky. 215, 259 S. W. 47 (1924).
that the vendor's inability to give the vendee a sufficient deed when the
title bond matured did not release the purchaser, who did not offer
to pay for the property or demand a deed, where the vendor sued for
specific performance and tendered a sufficient deed at the first term of
court thereafter. Gilloek v. Hoover, 207 Ky. 21, 268 S. W. 592 (1925).
(3)
If a bill is brought for specific performance by a party who
has been in default, and the court, after a consideration of all the circumstances, decides to grant specific performance, it is axiomatic that
the defendant will be granted compensation for the breach. In determining this question the court will give due consideration to all
factors involved and "pronounce such decree as is best suited to the
circumstances". Kereheval v. Swope, 22 Ky. (6 T. B. Mon.) 362, 366
(1827).
Where the vendor failed to give entire possession of land within

A. L. I.

:RESTATEMxENT OP Tim LAW Op CONTRACTS

437

the time specified, the vendee was allowed a just abatement out of the
unpaid purchase money. Henry v. Graddy, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 450
(1845); S1palding v. Alexander, 69 Ky. (6 Bush) 160 (1869) (quoting
and approving Section 775 of Story's Equity Jurisprudence, tenth
edition).
Where there is a deficiency in the amount of land contracted to
be sold, the vendee is entitled to a just abatement of the purchase
price. Clifton Land Go. v. Reister, 186 Ky. 155, 216 S. W. 342 (1919).
Or, if a lien exists on the land, the vendee may retain the amount of
the lien out of the purchase price. Posey v. Kimsey, 146 Ky. 205, 142
S. W. 703 (1912).

Section 376. Specific Enforcement in Favor of One Having Power to Terminate.
Specific enforcement will not be denied in favor of a party
merely because he has a power to terminate the contractual obligation, unless the power can be used in spite of the decree in
such a way as to deprive the defendant of the agreed exchange
for his performance.

Comment:
a. A power to terminate may be created by a provision in the
contract; or it may be created by the law independently of agreement,
as in the case of an infant's contract. The existence of such a power
does not justify the other party in refusing to perform; and it is not a
sufficient reason for refusal of specific performance if the power will
itself be extinguished either by the decree or by the defendant's performance. The rule stated in Section 373 requiring security that the
agreed exchange for the defendant's performance will be rendered is
applicable to cases falling within the present Section. If the power
to terminate is one reserved in the contract, its existence does not
impair the defendant's security, for the court can provide that either
the decree itself or the defendant's performance shall extinguish the
power. If it is such that this cannot be done, specific performance will
be refused for the reason that the security required by the rule stated
in Section 373 does not exist.
b. There are special reasons for applying the rule of the present
section in cases where the party having the power of termination has
rendered part performance or otherwise materially changed his position in reliance on the contract. Such action tends to make his
remedy in damages more certainly inadequate and may at the same
time give him a stronger economic interest in carrying the project
through, thus increasing the defendant's security. ...

Illustrations:
1. A, an infant, makes a bilateral contract with B to transfer
land to B for a price in money. Prior to his majority, A cannot obtain
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a decree for specific performance, even on condition of full payment
of the price, unless the law of the jurisdiction is such as to make the
court's decree conclusive on the infant so as to terminate his power of
avoidance. After a valid ratification, A may be able to obtain such a
decree ...
4. A makes a leasing contract with B, whereby B obtains the
right to all oil and gas that he can produce from A's farm within a
specified pariod and contracts to sink certain wells and to deliver to
A a royalty, of one-eighth of all oil and gas produced. The contract
also provides that B may at any time surrender the lease and terminate his duties on payment of $1.00. B sinks one well for 1,000 feet
without finding oil or gas and temporarily suspends work. A then
repudiates the lease and makes a similar leasing contract with C, who
knows of the previous contract with B. B can get an injunction preventing A and C from interfering with B's possession and enjoyment
and from taking oil and gas from the farm so long as B continues to
render substantial performance.

Annotation:
Our court has never found occasion to pass upon the question
immediately raised by this section. The section presupposes a valid,
binding contract wherein one party has the power to terminate his contractual liability.
In Southeastern Land Company v. Clem, 239 Ky. 417, 39 S. W.
(2d) 674 (1931), the lessor, or, in the event he sold the land, his
vendee, could terminate a lease, "when he wanted possession for his
own use" by giving six months' written notice. There were several
other conditions under which the lease could be terminated, all at the
election of the lessor. The lessee, conceiving that he had the same
right as the lessor to terminate the lease, gave notice and vacated the
premises. The lessor sued at at law for the rent for the balance of the
lease. The court held that the contract was valid and binding; that
the power of the lessor or his vendee to terminate did not make it
void for lack of mutuality of obligation. The action was at law and
there is not even dictum to support the conclusion, but it is believed
that the court might well decree specific performance of such a contract, giving a reasonable interpretation to the right of termination,
so as not to make it arbitrary or unduly oppressive upon the vendee.
Note the language of the court in the principal case on these points.
Berry v. FrIsbie, 120 Ky. 337, 343, 86 S. W. 558, 559 (1905), is
often cited, but the only thing appropos was a dictum that, "A unilateral executory contract is in law a nudum pactum, and is unenforceable. Where it is left to one of the parties to an agreement to
choose whether he will proceed or abandon it, neither can specifically
enforce its execution in equity." It is clear, however, that the court
was speaking of mutuality of obligation. Accord, Volz v. Soully, 159
Ky. 226, 230, 166 S. W. 1015 (1914).
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Section 377. Specific Enforcement Against One Having
Power to Terminate.
Specific enforcement will not be decreed against a party
who has the power of terminating his contractual duty and
thereby substantially nullifying the effect of the decree.
Camment:
a. A party to a contract may have the power of termination by
reason of a provision in the contract or by reason of some rule of law
applicable to such contracts. If the provision is such as to make the
party's promise illusory, there is no duty created (see Section 2); but
even if it is not illusory, specific performance will not be decreed
against one whose power of termination can be exercised so as substantially to nullify the effect of the decree. The extinguishment of
such a power may sometimes properly be decreed against one who is
himself seeking specific performance, but not against a defendant who
Is refusing to perform.
b. If the power is reserved to terminate by giving notice, this
will be sufficient to prevent specific enforcement only if the notice
will be operative so as to prevent or to discharge the duty to render
the very performance sought to be enforced by decree. In spite of a
power to terminate by giving a notice for thirty days (or for some
other specified period), there may be a duty to render very substantial performance during the thirty days of such a time as to be specifically enforceable.
c. If the reserved power to terminate can be exercised only at
the cost of some substantial alternative performance, a decree for
specific performance may properly be granted, conditioned upon the
defendant's not rendering the alternative performance. The effect of
such a decree would not be nullified by the exercise of the defendant's
power, since it would compel the defendant to render one of the
alternative performances.
d. The existence of such a power as that considered in the
Section does not necessarily prevent specific enforcement against the
opposite party (see Section 376).

Illustrations:
1. A contracts to sing in opera exclusively for B for a period
of two years, reserving power, however, to terminate all contractual
duties at or after the end of the first year by giving written notice.
The reservation of power is in itself sufficient to prevent specific enforcement after the first year, even though there is a breach and no
notice Is given; but it Is not sufficient to prevent enforcement by injunction theretofore, under the rule stated in Section 380. ...
3. A sells his business to B and contracts not to carry on a competing business, at the same time reserving the power to terminate
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his duty not to compete by paying to A the sum of $10,000. If A
threatens competition in breach of his contract, B may be given an
injunction preventing such competition as long as A does not pay the
$10,000.

Annotation:
The rule laid down by this section seems to the annotater to be
axiomatic. No Kentucky case has been found which raises the question directly. The section presupposes a valid, enforceable contract.
Cases are sometimes cited to support the proposition that are lacking in this respect.
It was conceded by counsel in Cain v. Garner, 169 Ky. 633, 185
S. W. 122 (1916), that contract of an infant for personal services was
terminable at the infant's election, and could not be enforced against
him. In Southeastern Land Company v. Clem, 239 Ky. 417, 39 S. W.
(2d) 674 (1931), the lessor of premises or a purchaser from him
could terminate the lease, "when he wanted possession for his own
use", etc., by giving six months' notice. The suit arose in an action
by the lessor for rent; under such a contract the lessee could not have
had specific performance, since the lessor under a bona fide desire for
possession could have nullified the effect of the decree. This, of course,
is only inference since this question was not before the court. See
the comment on the case, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 214.

Section 378. Effect of a Provision for a Penalty or Liquidated Damages.
The fact that a contract contains a provision for the payment of a penalty or liquidated damages for breach of a promise
is not a bar to the specific enforcement of the pormise.

Comment:
a. A provision for a penalty for the breach of a promise does not
afford an adequate remedy, in cases where damages are not adequate,
since the provision is not itself enforceable beyond the amount collectible as damages. Neither does a provision for the payment of a
sum as liquidated damages afford an adequate remedy, even though
it is itself an enforceable promise; since it is the uncertainty as to the
extent of injury that makes the provision for liquidated damages enforceable, and no one supposes that the parties by their advance agreement actually render the extent of injury certain. Such a provision,
unlike a penalty, affords a remedy; but it is not necessarily an adequate remedy. By a provision for liquidated damages the parties do
not mean that the amount fixed is an agreed price for the privilege not
to perform the promise. Where a contract contains a provision for
the payment of such a price as a true alternative performance, the
promisor's election to pay this price will prevent the specific enforcement of the other alternative against him.
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Annotation:
The cases in Kentucky indicate a view in accord with the restatement. Although a contract provides for liquidated damages fpr its
breach, a breach will be enjoined, if it appears from the whole instrument and the surrounding circumstances that the parties intended
performance of the contract, without an election to pay damages in
lieu of performance. Grant County Board of Control v. Allphin, 152
Ky. 280, 153 S. W. 417 (1913) (contract to pool a tobacco crop, contract containing a provision that if grower breached, he would pay to
the pooling society 20 per cent of the value of the crop as liquidated
damages). Potter v. Dark Tobacco Growers Co-Operative Association,
201 Ky. 441, 257 S. W. 33 (1923) (based on a statute but approving
the rule stated).
Where the parties contemplate that the payment of money is not
performance but is merely a penalty for non-performance, this does
not bar the giving of specific performance, even though the defendant
has already paid the money. Ochs v. Kramer, 32 Ky. L. R. 762, 107
S. W. 260 (1908). As to the distinction between a penalty or forfeiture and liquidated damages, see the discussion in Allison, Etc. v.
Cocke's Ex'rs., 106 Ky. 763, 783-787,,51 S. W. 593, 597-598 (1899).
Where the defendant's promise is in the alternative, either to do
or to refrain from doing certain acts, or to pay money at his option,
failure to perform is not a breach of the contract, and there is no
ground for equitable relief. Grant County Board of Control v. Aliphin,
supra (dictum). It is believed that Woodbury v. Turner, Etc., Mfg. Co.,
96 Ky. 459, 16 Ky. L. R. 566, 29 S. W. 295 (1895), Is not a contract
in the alternative, but, rather, one providing for liquidated damages
in case of breach, and that the court is contra to the restatement and
to the great weight of authority when it says by way of dictum at page
469 of the Kentucky Report, "if the appellee had instituted its suit for
specific performance, the answer would have been that the contract
has already been performed, because it provides that if the sale is not
consummated, the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars already paid to
the seller is to be the price of that failure." By the great weight of
authority the right to specific performance is not lost because the
amount payable in the event of a breach of the contract is fixed in
advance as liquidated damages.

Section 379. Contracts for Personal Service.
A promise to render personal service or supervision will
not be specifically enforced by an affirmative decree.
Comment:
a. In applying the rule stated in the Section, it Is the personal
character of the performance to be rendered that Is determinative, not
the personal character of the duty to render it. No contractual duty
Is ever assignable without the obligee's assent; but in many cases the
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performance required by the contractual duty is not the performance
of a specific person and can be delegated to another (see Section 160).
b. The promised performance is never personal service within
the meaning of the rule stated in the Section unless it is personal and
non-delegable in character. It cannot be said, however, that every
personal and non-delegable performance is necessarily to be described
as service. Such an act as the writing of a mere autograph or the
signing of a school diploma may be personal and non-delegable without preventing specific enforcement. Other factors of importance to
be considered are the existence of a personal relationship like that of
master and servant, the difficulty of enforcement and of testing the
quality of the performance actually rendered, and the length of time
that the promised performance will require. There are other Sections
also in which these factors are involved (see Sections 369, 371, 373).
c. Among the many varieties of personal service contracts to
which the rule of the Section applies are those requiring performance
as an actor, a singer, a sales-agent, a ball-player, a teacher, a mechanic,
a valet, a cook, a railway gate-tender, a personal custodian of children.
Among the contracts that are included are all contracts of employment
creating the intimate relation of kIaster and servant; the latter's performance is personal service and that of the former frequently involves personal supervision.

Ilustrations:
1. A contracts with B to play the part of Hamlet in B's theater.
A wrongfully refuses to play his part. B cannot get a decree requiring
him to act. If B wrongfully discharges A, the latter cannot get an
affirmative decree for specific performance (see Section 373) . ..
5. A, who Is the famous leader and director of an orchestra,
contracts with B that the latter shall play an instrument in the orchestra under A's supervision and leadership. Playing In the orchestra under A's supervision will greatly increase B's reputation and
earning power. B is wrongfully discharged. Although damages are
not an adequate remedy, B cannot get a decree specifically compelling
A to retain him in the orchestra.

Annotation:
While there are few eases that discuss the point raised by this
section, it is believed that Kentucky is in complete harmony with the
restatement. Perhaps the most extended discussion of the question
by the court, occurred in Edelen v. Samuels & Co., 126 Ky. 295, 31 Ky.
L. R. 731, 103 S. W. 360 (1907), where the court repeated the rule as
enunciated by Pomeroy, in his work on Specific Performance of Contracts, Sec. 310: "Contracts for personal services where the acts stipulated for require special knowledge, skill, ability, experience, or the
exercise of judgment, discretion, integrity, and the like personal qualities on the part of the employees, or where the services are confl-
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dentlal, In short, wherever the full performance, according to the
spirit of the agreement, rests in the individual will of the contracting
party, courts of equity have no direct and efficient means of affirmatively compelling a specific execution." Although the rule as stated is
dictum, since the court decided that the remedy at law on the facts
was adequate in the principal case, it was adopted by the court and is
believed to be a good statement of the existing law in Kentucky.
In Teeter v. Wi~liams, 42 Ky. (3 B. Mon.) 562 (1843), our court
by way of dictum said that a chancellor cannot compel a debtor to
perform an existing contract for labor in order that his creditor may
have the benefit of the earnings.
The reader 'should note the qualification on the rule of the restatement in the case of Schmidt v. L. & N. R. Co., 101 Ky. 441, 19 Ky.
L. R. 666, 41 S. W. 1015 (1897). This qualification is one consistently
Imposed by cases in other jurisdictions and in the usual discussions of
the rule in contracts for personal services. In cases of this type, the
problem of personal service is not really involved. The complainants
in the case were not interested in the personal service of particular individuals. They were only interested in results,-namely that the
railroad be operated. They did not care who operated it. In such
cases it is commonly held that the problems of personal service are
not Involved and that equity has jurisdiction and power to grant specific performance.

Section 380. Enforcement of Negative Duties that AcQom.
pany Affirmative Promises.
(1) An injunction against the breach of a contractual duty
that is negative in character may be granted either
(a) to prevent harm for which money damages are not an
adequate remedy caused by the breach of the negative
promise itself, even though there are accompanying
affirmative promises by either party that will not be
specifically enforced, unless such partial enforcement
will lead to unjust or harmful results; or
(b) as an indirect mode of specifically enforcing an accompanying affirmative promise, if it is likely to be effective for that purpose and if the affirmative promise is
itself one that would be enforced by affirmative decree
except for the mere practical difficulties of such enforcement.
(2) A contract to render personal service exclusively for
one employer will not be indirectly enforced by injunction
against serving another person, if
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(a) the employer is not ready and willing to continue to
perform his part of the contract; or
(b) performance of the contract will involve personal relations the enforced continuance of which is undesirable;
or
(c) the injunction will leave the employee without other
reasonable means of making a living; or
(d) the service is not unique or extraordinary in character.
Comment on Subsection (1):
a. A negative promise in a contract may be in specific promissory words of forbearance from action, or such a promise may be inferred from words not promissory in form or from other manifestations of intention (see Sections 2, 5). Enforcement by injunction is
equally available in either case.

d. Decrees requiring afflirmative performance are sometimes denied because of practical difficulties in enforcement by the court (see
Section 371). Such difficulties as these seldom exist with respect to
promises of forbearance. But such difficulties cannot be avoided by
the merely verbal expedient of using a double negative in the form of
the decree; a promise that in fact requires affirmative action cannot
be made specifically enforceable by injunction merely by interpreting
it as a promise not to forbear from performing or by enjoining the
promisor not to forbear from rendering performance or not to commit
a breach.
f. If the real purpose of enforcement of the negative duty is the
indirect enforcement of an accompanying affirmative promise, the difficulties that are involved in supervising and testing the promised performance are not completely avoided by the fact that the decree Is in
form an injunction against.breach of the negative duty only. The defendant may persist in refusing to perform affirmatively, while strictly
obeying the injunctive order. In such case the purpose of inducing
performance is not attained; but there is no contempt and no supervision or testing of performance is necessary. On the other hand, the
injunction may be effective in inducing an incomplete or defective
performace. Again, there is no contempt; but the court must then
test the performance and determine the extent of the defects in case
the plaintiff asks damages for his harm or the defendant asks compensation for his performance. If indirect enforcement by negative
decree is likely to fail of its purpose substantially and damages are
adequate compensation for harm caused by breach of th purely negative duties, the basis for an injunction becomes comparatively slight.
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Illustrations of Subsection (1) :
1. A contracts with B that the latter shall have the "first refusal" of A's house and lot on specified terms. A later offers to sell
the property to other persons without first offering it to B. The latter
can get an injunction preventing A from selling to others without first
offering to sell to B.
2. A contracts to sell and deliver to B all of the coal produced
by A's mine. A finds that he can sell to others at a higher price; and
he refuses to perform his contract. Similar coal of equally good
quality can be obtained conveniently elsewhere, and damages are an
adequate remedy. B cannot get a decree for specific performance or an
injunction preventing A from selling to others ...

Comment on Subsection (2) :
g. The rule stated in this subsection indicates the application of
general rules in one special class of cases. Contracts of personal employment very commonly contain negative promises, or otherwise
create negative duties, along with affirmative promises by both parties.
The enforcement of the affirmative promises is practically always prevented by the rules stated in Section 371, dealing with difficulty of enforcement, and in Section 379, dealing with contracts for personal
service. The result is that enforcement of the negative duty by injunction is a partial enforcement only, subjecting the case to the rule
stated in Section 365. In personal service cases, an injunction should
practically never be used primarily as an indirect means of enforcing
the affirmative promises; it should be restricted to cases where the
breach of the negative promise will in itself cause irreparable harm.
h. An injunction to enforce even the negative duty will generally
be refused if its effect is substantially to prevent the employee from
making a living in his accustomed vocation, the single alternative
being the perpetuation of undesirable personal relations with an employer or other persons with whom he is in serious conflict. This
would come near to the creation of an involuntary servitude. To
justify the granting of an injunction, it should appear that the employer is ready and willing to continue the employment in good faith
and that the employee is not being substantially forced back into the
old employ. Here again is a case for the exercise of sound judicial
discretion. Among the matters to be given special consideration are
the character of the service to be rendered, the probability of renewal
of good relations, the degree of inadequacy of other remedies, and the
hardship involved in the enforcement by injunction . ..

fliustrations of Subsection (2) :
6. A contracts to employ B, a noted opera singer, the latter
promising to sing in A's theater and not to sing at any competing
theater for a specified period. In breach of this contract, B contracts
to sing in C's competing theater. B's singing there will cause harm
to A for which damages are not an adequate remedy. B can easily
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make a good income singing in theaters not in competition with A's
theater. A can get an injunction preventing B from singing in the
other theater, although he cannot get an affirmative decree that B
shall sing in A's theater....

Annotation:
Subsection (1).
(a) Our court has approved this subsection. In Grant County
Board of Control v. Allphin, 152 Ky. 280, 153 S. W. 417 (1913), the defendant pooled a crop of tobacco. The court held that the very life
and success of the pool depended upon the enforcement of the individual contracts of growers with the pool and enjoined a breach by the
defendant. By statute now, Cooperative Marketing Associations may
embody negative promises in such contracts and secure injunctions
against the breach of them. The annotator has been unable to learn
from a reading of the principal case whether it contained' an expressed
negative promise. It probably contained one, however. 'See Bingham
Co-operative Marketing Act (1922), Ky. Statutes, 883f-1; Potter v. Dark
Tobacco Growers Co-operative Association, 201 Ky. 441, 257 S. W. 33
(1923). And, under Section 18 (c) of the above act, which creates a
conclusive presumption on the question of the landlord's power to control delivery, an injunction will lie against the tenant of a member
of the association. Feagain v. Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-operative
Association, 202 Ky. 801, 261 S. W. 607 (1924).
Section 18 (c) is a
most interesting illustration of a conclusive presumption by statute.
The rule that where a contract for the services of an artist contains negative covenants, violation of the covenants will be restrained
was affirmed by way of dictum in Cain v. Garner, 169 Ky. 633, 185
S. W. 122 (1916) (citing Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De G., M. & G. 604, 42
Eng. Rep. 687). Breach of an express covenant was restrained without discussion in Royer Wheel Company v. Miller, 20 Ky. L. R. 1831,
50 S. W. 62 (1899).
Express negative restrictions in conveyances will be enforced by
injunction. Sutton v. Head, 86 Ky. 156, 5 S. W. 410 (1887-) (covenant
not to sell liquor on the premises in less than five-gallon lots); Bennett
v. ConsolidatedRealty Company, 226 Ky. 747, 11 S. W. (2d) 910 (1928)
(covenant not to use lot for business purposes).
It is believed that in this state, in accord with the restatement the
negative covenant need not be an express one; it may be inferred. To
illustrate, the city of Newport entered into a binding contract with a
light company whereby the company was to furnish the city and its
inhabitants with gas in consideration of which the city granted the
company the "exclusive privilege" to use the city streets for the purpose of laying the necessary pipes, etc. Later, when the city attempted
to confer a like privilege upon another light company, an injunction
was granted enjoining the city from carrying out its intention. The
only logical basis for this decision is that the court implied a negative
covenant from the word "exclusive" and restrained a breach of this
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covenant. City of Newport v. Newport Light Company, 84 Ky. 166
(1886).
An injunction enforcing an implied negative covenant was
decreed in Gregg v. Starks, 188 Ky. 834, 224 S. W. 459 (1920), although
the decision does not discuss the question. See, also, Friedberg v.
Mc{lary, 173 Ky. 579, 191 S. W. 300 (1917), and Drake v. Black Diamond Coal Company, 28 Ky. L. R. 533, 89 S. W. 545 (1905). While
these decisions do not discuss the enforcement of negative duties or
inferred covenants, the problem is involved.
(b)
Grant County Board of Control v. Allphin, supra, is an illustration of an indirect method of specifically enforcing a contract, where
there are practical difficulties in the way of specific enforcement. The
court does not discuss the fact that it is enjoining the breach of a negative covenant as an indirect method of enforcing specific performance,
but that is what it is actually doing. And, see, Feagainv. Dark Tobacco
Growers' Association, supra.
Subsection (2).
There are no cases in Kentucky. It is believed that the rule of
the restatement, however, is too narrow and to a certain extent, at
least, contrary to the spirit of the decisions in a majority of the
personal service contract cases.
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